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Abstract
The virtual hand illusion (VHI) paradigm demonstrates that people tend to perceive agency and bodily ownership for a virtual 
hand that moves in synchrony with their own movements. Given that this kind of effect can be taken to reflect self–other 
integration (i.e., the integration of some external, novel event into the representation of oneself), and given that self–other 
integration has been previously shown to be affected by metacontrol states (biases of information processing towards per-
sistence/selectivity or flexibility/integration), we tested whether the VHI varies in size depending on the metacontrol bias. 
Persistence and flexibility biases were induced by having participants carry out a convergent thinking (Remote Associates) 
task or divergent-thinking (Alternate Uses) task, respectively, while experiencing a virtual hand moving synchronously or 
asynchronously with their real hand. Synchrony-induced agency and ownership effects were more pronounced in the con-
text of divergent thinking than in the context of convergent thinking, suggesting that a metacontrol bias towards flexibility 
promotes self–other integration.
Introduction
People are thought to store representations of their own 
body, so they can recognize themselves and discriminate 
themselves from others (Gallagher, 2000; Jeannerod, 2003). 
Popular methods to investigate how people represent their 
own and other bodies are paradigms producing the rubber 
hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) and the vir-
tual hand illusion (VHI; Slater, Perez-Marcos, Ehrsson, & 
Sanchez-Vives, 2008; Sanchez-Vives et al., 2010). In the 
original RHI paradigm, participants are facing a rubber 
hand lying beside/on top of their hidden real hand. If real 
and rubber hand are stroked synchronously (compared to a 
condition in which stroking is asynchronous), participants 
tend to attribute the felt stroking of their real hand to the 
rubber hand, judge the positions of their real hand as drifting 
towards the rubber hand and misperceive the rubber hand 
as their own. In the original VHI paradigm, participants are 
wearing a data glove on their real hand, which operates a 
virtual hand on a screen or virtual space in front of them. If 
virtual and real hand move in synchrony (compared to mov-
ing asynchronously), participants tend to perceive a sense 
of controlling the virtual hand, and misperceive the virtual 
hand as part of their own body. Hence, tight correlations 
between multisensory stimuli applied to, or produced by 
one’s own effector and an artificial effector close to one’s 
body seem sufficient to incorporate an artificial effector into 
one’s body representation.
The importance of such bottom-up factors notwithstand-
ing, the aim of the present study was to test whether the ease 
or degree of incorporating an artificial effector into one’s 
own body representation depends on cognitive control. 
Two basic assumptions motivated our approach. First, we 
assumed that people represent different parts of their body 
the same way as they represent body-unrelated objects. This 
assumption is based on the Theory of Event Coding (TEC, 
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Hommel, 
2004), according to which the cognitive system represents 
both perceived and produced events by integrated networks 
of codes of the features of these events. Importantly, TEC 
does not discriminate between social and non-social or self-
related and self-unrelated events (Hommel, Colzato, & van 
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den Wildenberg, 2009), and it allows for various degrees of 
event integration, including the integration of self and other 
(Colzato, Zech, Hommel, Verdonschot, van den Wilden-
berg, Hsieh, 2012). Second, we assumed that the degree of 
event integration depends on the present metacontrol state. 
According to the metacontrol state model (MSM; Hommel, 
2015), this state varies between the poles of extreme per-
sistence (a state characterized by a strong top-down influ-
ence of the current action goal, high selectivity, and strong 
mutual competition between alternative representations, e.g., 
in decision-making) and extreme flexibility (a state char-
acterized by weak top-down influence of the action goal, 
strong integration, and weak mutual competition). A bias 
towards persistence would be associated with the tendency 
to discriminate between given events whereas a bias towards 
flexibility would be associated with the tendency to integrate 
them. Importantly, this holds for both non-social and social 
events, including people and body parts (cf., Hommel & 
Colzato, 2017).
Applying these two assumptions to VHI, the paradigm we 
were using in the present study, motivates the prediction that 
a bias towards persistence would reduce, and a bias towards 
flexibility would increase the VHI: given that the illusion 
implies the integration of the representation of an artificial 
effector and the representation of one’s real body, a less 
integrative metacontrol state should indeed work against the 
illusion while a more integrative state should support it. As a 
method to bias participants towards persistence or flexibility, 
we used two kinds of creativity tasks: the Remote Associates 
Task (RAT; Mednick, 1962) and the Alternate Uses Task 
(AUT; Guilford, 1967). Both tasks call for some degree of 
top-down control (as they require a particular problem to be 
solved) and search (for the solution of this problem), and 
thus arguably require some degree of persistence and some 
degree of flexibility. And yet, the RAT requires the highly 
constrained search for one possible solution (convergent 
thinking in the terminology of Guilford, 1967) while the 
AUT requires a loosely constrained search for as many solu-
tions as possible (divergent thinking)—which implies that 
the RAT relies more on persistence and less on flexibility 
than the AUT (Hommel, 2012).
Assuming that this leads people to establish a more 
persistence-heavy metacontrol state when working on the 
RAT and a more flexibility-heavy state when working on 
the AUT, studies have used these tasks to prime metacon-
trol towards persistence and flexibility, respectively, and to 
test whether the latter leads to more integration than the 
former. For instance, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, and 
Hommel (2013) found evidence of more self–other inte-
gration in a joint Simon task when it was interleaved with 
an AUT than when it was interleaved with an RAT. Along 
the same lines, Sellaro, Hommel, de Kwaadsteniet, van de 
Groep, and Colzato (2014) found more interpersonal trust 
when participants just completed an AUT than when they 
just completed an RAT. As these observations confirm the 
assumption that RAT and AUT are effective in biasing peo-
ple’s metacontrol state towards persistence and flexibility, 
respectively, we used these two tasks as metacontrol primes 
in the present study as well. Hence, we not only assumed that 
performing the RAT and the AUT would lead participants 
to establish metacontrol states biased towards persistence 
and flexibility, respectively, but we also assumed that these 
states would be sufficiently inert to affect the following VHI 
induction (i.e., the synchrony manipulation) accordingly. To 
make sure that the induced metacontrol state would still be 
sufficiently strong during this induction, we interleaved crea-
tivity task and (a)synchrony presentation in such a way that 
participants switched repeatedly between the two.
Taken altogether, we thus predicted that the VHI would 
be more pronounced if carried out in the context of an AUT 
than if carried out in the context of an RAT. We further 
considered the possibility that being exposed to synchrony 
vs. asynchrony between one’s own and an artificial hand 
might also have an impact on metacontrol, which in turn 
might influence performance in the two creativity tasks. In 
particular, if being exposed to synchrony would bias metac-
ontrol towards flexibility (i.e., integration), it is possible that 
this would be more beneficial for performance on the AUT 
than for performance on the RAT, while the opposite would 
hold for exposure to asynchrony. To test these possibilities, 
we thus looked into both the impact of engaging in a par-
ticular creativity task on VHI (as measured by comparing 
synchronous with asynchronous conditions) and the impact 
of experiencing synchronous and asynchronous conditions 
on performance in the creativity tasks. Our main meas-
ure referred to the subjective perception of ownership and 
agency (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), but we also included an 
implicit measure (perceptual drift rates; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 
2012) for explorative purposes.
Method
Participants
Twenty healthy young adults, with a mean age of 20.1 years 
(SD = 1.2; range 19–23; 7 male), from Southwest Univer-
sity, China, participated in this experiment for a financial 
reward. Given the unpredictable effect size, the sample size 
was chosen following our lab standard for novel manipu-
lations. Participants were naive with respect to RHI/VHI. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants 
before the experiment. The protocol was approved by the 
local ethical committee (Southwest University, Faculty of 
Psychology).
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Experimental setup
The study was performed in a virtual reality environment. 
The experimental setup was the same as in an earlier study 
(Ma & Hommel, 2013; Ma, Lippelt & Hommel, 2017), as 
shown in Fig. 1a. It is comprised of a data glove (5DT, meas-
urement frequency = 75 Hz, latency = 13 ms) with 14 high-
accuracy joint-angle sensors to accurately measure hand and 
finger real-time motions; a black box (45 cm width × 15 cm 
height × 35 cm depth) into which the participant put his 
or her right hand along the depth axis; a cloth which was 
placed over the participant’s right shoulder to cover the 
space between the virtual effector and the participant (i.e., 
participants could not see their real right hand); and the vir-
tual reality software Vizard (http://www.worldviz.com/). We 
imported a premade 3D virtual hand model (as shown in 
Fig. 1b) and the data glove module into Vizard, so that the 
virtual hand received the digital joint-angle data collected 
with the data glove sensors from the real hand movement of 
the participant. Given the refresh rate of the equipment, the 
time delay in all conditions was around 13 ms (on top of the 
intentional delay in the asynchrony condition).
Virtual hand illusion
Each VHI condition consisted of an illusion-induction phase 
of about 120 s, during which participants were to move their 
real hand freely and could watch the corresponding move-
ments of the virtual hand, either in synchrony or out of syn-
chrony (i.e., with a 3-s delay; see Ma & Hommel, 2013).
Questionnaire
To assess the extent to which participants experienced the 
VHI, we used a short version of the standard RHI/VHI ques-
tionnaire (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Slater et al., 2008; Ma 
& Hommel, 2015). The statements for virtual hand condi-
tions contained two questions: Q1 (“I can freely control this 
virtual hand as I wish”) to assess the sense of agency and 
Q2 (“I felt as if the virtual hand on the screen were my right 
hand”) to assess the ownership illusion. For each statement, 
participants responded by choosing a score on a seven-point 
(1–7) Likert scale, ranging from 1 for ‘strongly disagree’ to 
7 for ‘strongly agree’, and 4 means ‘uncertain’.
Proprioceptive drift
As an implicit measure of the illusion, proprioceptive drift 
was used—which assesses the degree to which participants 
feel their real right hand to be located nearer to the virtual 
hand after the illusion was induced. Participants were asked 
to use the index finger of their left hand to touch a position 
on a board, which was attached to the left side of the box, 
to indicate the felt vertical position of their right index fin-
ger (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012). Participants pointed before 
and after each block—with the discrepancy between these 
two measures being the main dependent variable. During 
the process, participants kept their right hand flat and static 
on the bottom of the box. The proprioceptive drift result 
was then calculated by subtracting the post-block position 
from pre-block position. With the screen level set to be zero, 
positive values indicate that participants exhibited an upward 
drift of the real hand position, i.e., a drift towards the virtual 
hand.
Remote associates task (RAT)
In the RAT (Mednick, 1962), participants are presented with 
three words and are asked to find a common associate (e.g., 
cottage, swiss, and cake = cheese). We used six Chinese 
RAT versions, each containing five different items. Each 
version was to be responded to within 2 min.
Alternate uses task (AUT)
In the AUT (Guilford, 1967), participants are presented with 
a common household item and are asked to list as many pos-
sible uses as they can within a particular time limit. We used 
six items (pen, newspaper, tower, bottle, brick, and paper 
clip, all in Chinese) and had participants respond within 
2 min for each one. As usual, the results were scored accord-
ing to fluency, flexibility, originality, and elaboration. We 
Fig. 1  The experimental setup. 
a The participant put his/her 
real hand inside the box while 
the virtual hand was shown 
on the screen placed on top of 
the box; i.e., the virtual hand 
appeared on top of the real hand 
(Ma & Hommel, 2015). b The 
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will report all data but will focus on flexibility (the number 
of responses, weighted by the number of different catego-
ries), the theoretically most transparent measure and the one 
that in our research turned out to be the most consistent and 
reliable indicator of divergent thinking (e.g., Akbari Cher-
mahini & Hommel, 2012; Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & 
Hommel, 2013).
Design and procedure
A within-participant design was used. Each participant 
came to the lab to be tested twice (i.e., for two sessions); the 
synchrony and the creativity task (RAT or AUT) were both 
(fully counterbalanced) within-participant factors. Half of 
the participants were tested with RAT in the first session and 
AUT in the second session, the other half were tested in the 
reverse order. Half of the participants always experienced 
the synchronous followed by the asynchronous VHI condi-
tion in each session, while the other half always experienced 
the reverse order. Following the protocol of Colzato et al. 
(2013), we interleaved the VHI (synchronous or asynchro-
nous) manipulations with AUT items/RAT versions, so to 
increase the possibility that creativity task-induced metacon-
trol states would affect the VHI assessment. The experiment 
was thus composed of 12 (six synchronous and six asynchro-
nous) VHI manipulations, six RATs, and six AUTs in total.
Every time a participant came to the lab, he or she was 
seated in front of the black box with a computer monitor 
on its top. The participant would wear the data glove on his 
or her right hand, and then put his or her hand inside the 
box, would take on the cloth, and look down on the moni-
tor, where the creativity tasks and the VHI conditions were 
presented. During the VHI induction, the virtual hand was 
visible on the monitor while the creativity task material was 
invisible; and the opposite was true during the creativity 
task. Participants replied to the questionnaire and the crea-
tivity tasks verbally, and their answers were recorded by the 
experimenter.
Table 1 shows an example of the experimental procedure 
(i.e., one of the four balanced combinations of creativity task 
and synchrony). Each of the two sessions consisted of two 
blocks. In the first block, the participant would first undergo 
the first perceptual drift measurement and then being pre-
sented with one kind of creativity task (e.g., RAT). He or she 
would then switch between performing the three versions of 
this task and the three synchrony manipulations of the same 
type (e.g., synchronous motion of own and virtual hand). 
Performing the entire block thus resulted in having com-
pleted three versions of the same creativity task and three 
versions of the same synchrony condition. Finally, the par-
ticipant would respond to the two questionnaire items and 
undergo the second perceptual drift measurement to assess 
perceived agency and ownership. In the second block of 
the same session, the creativity task would stay the same 
(RAT in this example), but three new versions would be 
presented, and the synchrony condition would differ (asyn-
chronous motion of own and virtual hand in the example). 
The participant would again undergo the first perceptual drift 
measurement, switch between three versions of the creativity 
task and three new synchrony manipulations. Finally, the 
participant would again undergo the second perceptual drift 
measurement and respond to the agency and the ownership 
item. Performing the entire session thus resulted in having 
completed six versions of the same creativity task, three ver-
sions of one of the two synchrony conditions and three ver-
sions of the other synchrony condition. The second session 
would have the same structure (including the order of the 
synchrony condition), only that the creativity task would 
change. Briefly, participants were asked to constantly switch 
between performing the AUT/RAT for 2 min and experi-
ence VHI for 2 min. In total, participants were to switch 
between the creativity tasks and the VHI manipulations for 
three times in each block. Between each two blocks, but not 
within every block, participants were asked to take a 2 min 
rest to reduce the possible bias from previous block.
Results
A significance level of p < 0.05 was adopted for all tests.
VHI
We submitted the agency and ownership ratings to a 2 (task: 
RAT vs. AUT) × 2 (synchrony: synchronous vs. asynchro-
nous) repeated-measures ANOVA (in which the synchrony 
effect indicates the illusion) separately. As indicated by 
Fig. 2 (left panel), the main effect of synchrony was signifi-
cant for both agency, F(1,19) = 69.47, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.79; 
and ownership, F(1,19) = 28.83, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.60. 
Table 1  The experimental 
design and procedure
PD1 pre-block proprioceptive drift, PD2 post-block proprioceptive drift, Q questionnaire, sync synchro-
nous, async asynchronous
First session Block 1 PD1, RAT, VHI(sync), RAT, VHI(sync), RAT, VHI(sync), PD2, Q
Block 2 PD1, RAT, VHI(async), RAT, VHI(async), RAT, VHI(async), PD2, Q
Second session Block 1 PD1, AUT, VHI(sync), AUT, VHI(sync), AUT, VHI(sync), PD2, Q
Block 2 PD1, AUT, VHI(async), AUT, VHI(async), AUT, VHI(async), PD2, Q
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While the task did not yield any effect, Fs(1,19) < 1, the 
interaction was significant for both agency, F(1,19) = 5.44, 
p = 0.031, ηp2 = 0.22; and ownership, F(1,19) = 5.03, 
p = 0.037, ηp2 = 0.21. For both items, the interaction was 
due to a smaller synchrony effect in the context of the RAT 
than in the context of the AUT: two-tailed paired t-tests of 
the synchrony effect  (scoresynchronous − scoreasynchronous, which 
represents the strength of the VHI) in the RAT and AUT 
conditions yielded significant differences for agency (2.65 
vs. 3.70), t(19) = 2.33, p = 0.031, d = 0.53, and ownership 
(0.9 vs. 1.75), t(19) = 2.24, p = 0.037, d = 0.61.
We also submitted the proprioceptive drift results to a 2 
(task: RAT vs. AUT) × 2 (synchrony: synchronous vs. asyn-
chronous) repeated-measures ANOVA (in which the syn-
chrony effect indicates the illusion). As indicated by Fig. 2 
(right panel), the main effect of synchrony was significant, 
F(1,19) = 4.79, p = 0.041, ηp2 = 0.20, with the drift ratings 
significantly higher in synchronous (mean = 0.19, stand-
ard error = 0.38) than in asynchronous (mean = − 1.00, 
SE = 0.30) conditions. Neither the task effect nor the inter-
action yielded any effect, Fs(1,19) < 3.13, ps > 0.093.
Creativity task performance
Of the three creativity measures per block, we considered 
the first (which preceded all synchrony manipulations) 
to represent the baseline and the average of the second 
and third to reflect effects of synchrony on creativity. 
The changes from baseline (i.e., average of second and 
third measure minus first measure) were submitted to a 
2(task: RAT vs. AUT) × 2 (synchrony: synchronous vs. 
asynchronous) repeated-measures ANOVA. In the follow-
ing, we present the findings for RAT and AUT-flexibility 
(for other AUT scores, see “Appendix”).
As indicated by Fig. 3, the main effect of synchrony 
was significant, F(1,19) = 8.12, p = 0.010, ηp2 = 0.30, as 
was the main effect of task, F(1,19) = 10.70, p = 0.004, 
ηp2 = 0.36. Most importantly, the interaction was also 
significant, F(1,19) = 8.48, p = 0.009, ηp2 = 0.31. Sepa-
rately, hypothesis-driven two-tailed paired t-tests yielded 
no significant differences between score changes for RAT 
and AUT in synchronous conditions, t(1,19) < 0.3, while 
there was a significant difference in asynchronous con-
ditions, t(19) = 6.81, p < 0.001, d = 1.81: as shown in 
Fig. 3, the RAT score increases (0.68, SE = 0.31) while 
the AUT-flexibility score is reduced (− 2.0, SE = 0.35) in 
asynchronous conditions. Additional exploratory t-tests, in 
which we Bonferroni-corrected the significance criterion 
for multiple comparisons (α = 0.05/4 = 0.0125), confirmed 
that, in the asynchronous conditions the negative-going 
AUT score changes were significantly different from zero, 
t(19) = 5.66, p < 0.001, d = 1.26, while the positive-going 
RAT score changes were not, t(19) = 2.20, p = 0.04.
Fig. 2  Left panel: Questionnaire scores for agency and ownership, as a function of creativity task and synchrony. Agen: agency, Own: owner-
ship; Right panel: Proprioceptive drift results as a function of creativity task and synchrony. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error
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Discussion
The findings are clear-cut. As in previous studies, partici-
pants were more likely to experience subjective agency and 
ownership for a virtual hand if it moved in synchrony with 
their own, real hand. As predicted, the size of this effect was 
significantly moderated by the type of creativity task in the 
context of which the illusion was induced. In the context of 
the RAT, which we assume to bias metacontrol towards per-
sistence (and thus increase top-down control and event dis-
crimination), the illusion was markedly smaller than in the 
AUT context, which we assume to bias metacontrol towards 
flexibility and integration. This suggests that the perception 
of body ownership in general, and the integration of candi-
date effectors in particular, are moderated by metacontrol. 
More specifically, persistence seems to support self–other 
segregation while flexibility promotes self–other integration. 
Given that persistence and flexibility was induced by means 
of tasks without any obvious social or self-related implica-
tions, this finding is consistent with TECs assumption that 
the cognitive representations of body parts are no different 
from cognitive representations of body-unrelated events and 
objects. The finding also fits with predictions from MSM, 
especially with respect to the impact of metacontrol on event 
integration.
It is interesting to note that the explicit measure of own-
ership, as assessed by the questionnaire, was sensitive to 
the metacontrol manipulation while the implicit measure, as 
assessed by the perceptual drift, was not. Like many previ-
ous dissociations between explicit and implicit measures of 
ownership (Holmes, Snijders, & Spence, 2006), this obser-
vation provides converging evidence that the two measures 
do not rely on exactly the same information. It may be that 
conscious self-perception of ownership is depending on 
more, or more integrated information than proprioceptive 
drift rates, which may rely more on multisensory discrep-
ancy (Rohde, Di Luca, & Ernst, 2011).
The creativity tasks did not only serve to induce metac-
ontrol-biases but they were also affected by the synchrony 
manipulation, which was also thought to be able to induce 
different metacontrol states. The outcome pattern seems to 
suggest that perceiving asynchrony between events promotes 
convergent, but impairs divergent thinking, while perceiv-
ing synchrony has little effect. The reason may be the rela-
tively low illusion strength: the ownership ratings for syn-
chronous conditions were not very high, and the ownership 
ratings for asynchronous conditions were quite low. This 
might suggest that synchrony did not induce strong flex-
ibility but asynchrony induced strong persistence. If so, the 
asynchrony conditions would indeed be expected to improve 
performance in tasks that rely on persistence, such as the 
RAT, and to impair performance in tasks that rely on flex-
ibility, such as the AUT.
It is important to keep in mind the fact that our present 
findings were obtained in a paradigm that strongly inter-
leaved what we considered the task prime (i.e., the particu-
lar creativity task) and the induction of the VHI—the pro-
cess we aimed to prime. The practical reason to do so was 
to increase the probability that the metacontrol state that 
the creativity tasks were hypothesized to induce or estab-
lish would be sufficiently close in time to the synchrony 
manipulation to have an impact on the thereby induced 
changes in self-perception. However, this implies that we 
are unable to disentangle the effects of the task prime proper 
and the effects of possible interactions between this task 
prime and the synchrony manipulation. There are indeed 
reasons to assume that such interactions are not unlikely 
to have occurred and that they would make perfect theo-
retical sense. The observation that the VHI was affected by 
the type of creativity task and performance in the creativity 
tasks was affected by the synchrony manipulation suggests 
some degree of overlap between the ways that engaging 
in particular creativity tasks and experiencing particular 
degrees of synchrony are able to bias perceived ownership 
and agency. In terms of our theoretical framework, this 
implies that engaging in divergent thinking biases metac-
ontrol towards flexibility in similar ways as experiencing 
synchrony between one’s own movements and those of a 
virtual effector does, while engaging in convergent think-
ing biases metacontrol towards persistence as experiencing 
asynchrony does. What the present findings demonstrate is 
Fig. 3  Creativity task scores for RAT and AUT (flexibility) score 
changes from baseline in all four blocks. Error bars represent ± 1 
standard error
126 Psychological Research (2020) 84:120–127
1 3
that both kinds of manipulation together bias the VHI in 
the predicted direction, but they do not allow to statistically 
or numerically separate and estimate the contribution that 
each of the two confounded manipulations might have made. 
Accordingly, the present findings should not be taken to pro-
vide conclusive evidence that priming tasks alone are able 
to change self-perception without being supported (and per-
haps even enabled) by the experience of synchrony between 
proprioceptive and visual action feedback.
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Appendix
AUT scores (means and standard errors of change from 
baseline) as a function of synchrony.
Synchronous Asynchronous
AUT-fluency − 0.33/0.48 − 2.25/0.48
AUT-elaboration − 0.23/0.19 0.15/0.21
AUT-originality 1.00/0.22 − 0.68/0.37
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